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CORPORATIONS-CAPITAL AND STOCK-APPLICABILITY OF REsTRICTIONS ON 
TRANSFER OF STOCK TO TRANSFER CAUSED BY DEATH-The stock of the Tay-
lor Trunk Company, with the exception of the two shares now in contro-
versy, was divided equally between two brothers, the remaining two shares 
having been held by a third brother now deceased. A by-law provided: 
"That no transfer or sale of the stock of the Company can be made with-
out first offering said stock for sale to the remaining stockholders. . . ." 
The administrator with will annexed and the legatee of the decedent 
sought in this action to have the two shares of stock owned by decedent 
at his death transferred on the books of the corporation to the legatee with-
out first offering to sell the shares to the other stockholders. The circuit 
court ruled that the corporation did not have to transfer the stock until the 
by-law had been complied with. From this judgment the administrator and 
legatee appealed. Held, reversed. Although such a by-law is valid, it will 
be strictly construed and held applicable only to a voluntary sale. Taylors 
Administrator v. Taylor, (Ky. 1957) 301 S.W. (2d) 579. 
Although at present no state has a separate close corporation law,1 many 
of our legal standards designed primarily to regulate large public-issue 
corporations are inappropriate when applied to the close corporation.2 
Thus, those individuals who desire the limited liability of a corporation 
lAs recently as the Spring of 1957 the idea was rejected in New York. See Interim 
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee To Study Revision of Corporation Laws, 
Appendix K, 8 McKinney's Session Law News of New York 19 CTuly IO, 1957). The 
author did, however, recommend that special consideration be given to the close corpora-
tion within the structure of the general corporation statute making particular reference 
to the adoption of a provision similar to N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1955) §55-73(b). 
2 For a general discussion see Winer, "Proposing a New York 'Close Corporation 
Law,'" 28 CORN. L. Q. 313 (1943). 
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but also the power to select associates and the ability to retain control 
within this select group characteristic of a partnership must continue to 
work within the norms prescribed for the publicly held corporation. One 
of the most burdensome of these norms is the principle of free transferabili-
ty of shares,3 which, although quite appropriate and desirable in the large 
corporation, tends to defeat the purpose of the close corporation. To secure 
the desired delectus persona: and retention of control, resort is commonly 
had to a restriction on the alienability of the shares. These restraints, which 
can take many forms,4 may be expressed in a separate stockholders' agree-
ment, the charter, or, although there exists some authority to the contrary,11 
the by-laws. Since such restraints are in derogation of the principle of free 
transferability, they were at first held invalid by the courts.6 However, a 
growing awareness of the problems of the close corporation has resulted in 
the general acceptance of a reasonable restraint, such as the "first option" 
provision employed in the principal case.7 In spite of this general recogni-
tion the use of such restraints is still encumbered by a vestige of the doctrine 
of free transferability which takes its form in the general policy of the courts 
to construe such provisions strictly8 and not to apply them to transactions 
not expressly referred to therein.9 Yet, if a first option provision is to ful-
fill its function it must apply to all dispositions. Therefore, to broaden the 
coverage of the restriction to encompass all possible changes in ownership, 
the restraint frequently has been made applicable to all "transfers." A 
few courts, whose attitude is more in harmony with the needs of the close 
corporation in this area, have given the word "transfer" the more liberal · 
interpretation necessary to make the restraint truly effective.10 However, 
3 For statement of general rule see 12 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §5452 
(1957). 
4 For examples see O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Cor-
porations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 776 (1952). 
11 See STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d ed., §129, p. 
601 (1949). 
6 E.g., Bloede v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 A. 1127 (1896). 
7 See Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (1930); CHRISTY 
AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., §39, p. 75 (1940), and cases cited. 
8 See, e.g., Oakland Scavenger Co. v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. (2d) 69 at 83, 124 P. (2d) 
143 (1942). 
ODobry v. Dobry, (Okla. 1953) 262 P. (2d) 691. 
10 In Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A. (2d) 796 (1939), where the words "sold or 
transferred" were used in the by-law, the court said at p. 548: " ... transfer is a more 
comprehensive word than sale. Transfer . . . means a change of ownership. . . ." In 
Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of the American 
Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E. (2d) 447 (1953), where the words "sale, pledge or 
transfer" were used, the court held that although title passed to the executor by opera-
tion of law he stood in the shoes of the testatrix subject to the same restrictions on 
transfer and, therefore, had to offer the shares to the corporation before there could 
be a valid distribution to the legatees. Distinguished in the principal case because of the 
existence of Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §395,230, which authorizes the court to grant a distribu-
tion order for stock owned by the deceased upon petition of his personal representative 
after provision has •been made for taxes and if such order would be proper. See also 
Kentucky Package Store v. Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E. (2d) 139 (1954). 
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the position of the court in the principal case in construing the word as 
applicable only to a voluntary sale is consistent with that adopted in other 
jurisdictions where the word "transfer" was used alone or in conjunction 
with the word "sale" and a devolution of title occurred.11 Similarly, the 
courts have held that such restrictions do not apply to other involuntary 
transfers.12 
It would appear that since the interests of corporate creditors and of 
the general public are not adversely affected by such partial restraints, and 
that' since the general desire and necessity for such restraints is amply dem-
onstrated by the frequency of their use, the courts could adopt a more 
liberal attitude in the interpretation of this provision. Until this comes 
about, however, the solution to this problem lies in carefully drafting the 
articles and by-laws to include every contingency intended to bring the 
option into existence. Thus where the by-law or agreement has specifically 
covered the case of death, it has been held binding on the executor or ad-
ministrator either as a by-law or a contract.13 
Robert P. Luciano 
11 Stern v. Stem, ~.C. Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 870; Elson v. Security State Bank of 
Allerton, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.'W. (2d) 525 (1955); Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 
79 N.Y.S. 947 (1903), where the restriction was in the articles of association of a joint 
stock company. 
12 McDonald v. Farley &: Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939) 
(sale by receiver pursuant to a court order); Barrows v. National Rubber c;o., 12 R.I. 173 
(1878) (sale under execution); Fanchon &: Marco, Inc. v. Paramount ·Pictures, (S.D. N.Y. 
1952) 107 F. Supp. 532, revd. on other grounds (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 731, on remand 
(S.D. N.Y. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 839 (transfer pursuant to a decree in an antitrust proceed-
ing); In the Matter of Trilling and Montague, (E.D. Pa. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 260 (bank-
ruptcy sale). , 
13 New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894); Krebs v. 
McDonald's Ex'x., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87. See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of 
Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 773 (1952). 
